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The powers, the jurisdiction, and the decisions of the Su-
preme Court seem invariably to have been and to be the objects
of constant challenge on the part of disaffected groups in one
political party or the other. The very nature of the judicial
process, which makes it necessary for our court of last resort
to determine ultimate rights between the conflicting jurisdictions
in our composite Federal-National scheme of government,
should convince the skeptic that the Supreme Court cannot hope
to escape criticism, opposition, and even resistance on the part
of such groups. It is unfortunate that the legislation which must
undergo judicial examination is so often of great political, eco-
nomic, and social importance. That the Court has as often
demonstrated rare qualities of courage, in performing its thank-
less duties, can hardly be denied. Almost as soon as the new
Federal Government was formed, the opposition group - the
early Republicans, led by Madison and Jefferson - assailed
the Court for its failure to hold unconstitutional the act of Con-
gress chartering the First Bank of the United States. Finance
was one of the most urgent problems facing the new govern-
ment, and the Bank Bill' was a Hamilton measure designed to
aid in establishing the national credit. While the bill was in
Washington's hands, awaiting his signature, he asked the Heads
of the Departments of State and the Treasury for opinions on
the constitutionality of the measure. The two state papers sub-
mitted in answer to this request may well be considered the
classic expositions of the conflicting theories set forth therein.
Jefferson, holding the bill unconstitutional as exceeding the
powers expressly delegated to the National Government, ad-
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1 i Stat. L. 191 (i79).
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vanced a doctrine of "strict construction." 2 Hamilton urged a
liberal or "qoose construction" of the powers delegated in the
Constitution.8
The failure of the Supreme Court to condemn the Alien and
Sedition Laws' and the Judiciary Act i8oi' (Federalist
measures) occasioned additional complaints that the Court was
indoctrinated with Federalist principles. The Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts, drastic pieces of legislation, were vigorously opposed
as contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. As a public protest
against these acts - and indeed against the entire doctrine of
"loose construction"--resolutions were drawn up and submitted
to the other States and to Congress by Kentucky and Virginia
(1798) .' The doctrine of states' rights, as developed by Jeffer-
son and Madison, was later quoted by many a State which, in
1798, had resisted the implications of the compact theory. The
Judiciary Act, enacted less than three weeks before the end of
the Federalist regime, was thought to be an attempt on the part
of that party-beaten in the election and consequently deprived
of control of the political branches of the Government-to en-
trench itself in the Judiciary. The Republicans repealed the
act (182), though the measure had some very commend-
able features.7
The Federalists, in turn an opposition party, attacked the
Court for failing to hold invalid the treaty of purchase to the
Louisiana country. This group, hitherto the staunch advocates
3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Library ed., 145 (1903).3 3 The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge ed., 18o (1885).
4 1 Stat. L. 570 (1798), 596 (1798).
5 z Stat. L. 89 (I8OI).
'The Federalist, Ford ed., app. 679-686 (c. 1898). Authorship of the
Kentucky Resolutions has been attributed to Jefferson (then Vice-President of
the United States); Madison is recognized as the author of the Virginia Resolu-
tions.
7 Notably the creation of sixteen new circuit judgeships and the consequent
relieving the Supreme Court Justices of the onerous duty of riding circuit.
Adams' appointment (under the Act of i8oi) of the "midnight judges" was
challenged in the case of Marbury v. Madisoin, I Cranch 137 (I8o3). For
the Act of 1802, see z Stat. L. 132 (1802).
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of "loose construction", opposed the purchase as an act exceed-
ing the powers expressly delegated to the National Govern-
ment.' It would be difficult to find a dearer instance of the con-
traditions of politics than this about-face on the part of the
Federalists. Perhaps they were only fulfilling their mission as
an opposition party, i. e., to oppose. Hostility toward Jeffer-
son's embargo and non-intercourse program9 was, of course, to
be expected from a shipping and commercial center such as
Federalist New England. For the same reason, entrance into
the War of 18 12 (which threatened the English trade) was
resisted by the same section. The refusal to comply with the
terms of the Militia and Conscription Acts' and the assembling
of the Hartford Convention (1 8 14) " were means calculated to
express disapproval of the nation's war policy. The failure of
the Court to restrict the exercise of war powers by Congress
prompted the usual outcry that the rights of the States were
being sacrificed upon the altar of nationalism.
Nor was the Court destined to escape the most determined
kind of opposition on the part of the Jacksonian Democrats.
The Court's pronouncement of the theory of "divided sover-
eignty" and the doctrine of "implied powers" (i819)1" was
opposed as giving a carte blanche to Congress which had already
chartered the Second Bank of the United States ( 1816), estab-
lished a protective tariff (1 8 16), and was then considering the
s While Jefferson favored an amendment (to the Constitution) authoriz-
ing the purchase, he put aside his constitutional scruples in order to consum-
mate the deal while Napoleon I was willing to sell. X The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson, Library ed., 4z5, 427, 432, 434 (903)-
z Stat. L. 451 (807), 453 (x8o8), 473 (i8o8), 5z8 (18o9), 547
(8o9). For protests by the New England States, see H. V. Ames, State Docu-
menu, nos. 1S-zz (i9o6).
10 1 Stat. L. 424 (1795); 2 Stat. L. 787 (1812), 794. (1813). See also,
Ames, State Documents, nos. 27-32 (i9o6).
"1 Ames, State Documents, nos. 35-41 (19o6).
"2 Marshall said: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." McCullock v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 At. 4ZO (1819).
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matter of internal improvements-acts thought to be beyond
the scope of Federal powers. The protective tariff and internal
improvements were corner-stones in Clay's great edifice: the
American System. The East was to profit from the former; the
West from the latter; while the South, sensing a sectional
bargain at its expense, opposed both measures. Fired by the
preachments of Calhoun, the high priest of state sovereignty,
South Carolina undertook through an ordinance of nullification
to declare the Tariff of 1832 void and inoperative. 3 Congress
held out a sword and an olive branch, and South Carolina chose
the latter-preferring the terms of the Compromise Tariff of
1833 to those of the Force Bill. 4 The chief opposition to the
Second Bank of the United States came from the Western
debtor communities which wanted easy credit and cheap money.
Viewing the Bank as the creature of Eastern capitalism, several
of the States sought to tax the local branches out of existence.
The fact that the Supreme Court invalidated the Maryland law
taxing the branch at Baltimore (1819) did not deter an agent
of the State of Ohio from forcibly entering the vaults of the
branch Bank at Chillicothe and from removing the specie which
he found there-the Bank having refused to pay the taxes
which the State had assessed."8 Resolutions adopted by the
Ohio Legislature asserted the right of the State to tax all private
corporations doing business within the State, regardless of any
powers of incorporation which Congress may have exercised. 7
The decision in ZI'cColloch v. Maryland (1819) " may have
announced the law, but the proper relation of the National
Government to the States and the authority of decisions by the
Supreme Court were still matters of dispute.
The sustaining of the hated Fugitive Slave Act (of 1850),
on the one hand, and the failure to uphold the Legal Tender
"a Ames, State Documents, no. 83 (19o6).
'14 Stat. L. 629 (1833), 632 (1833).
'" McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
16 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
'
7 Ames, State Documents, no. 45 (I9O6).
18 4 Wheat. 316.
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Acts, on the other, were equally resisted by leaders in the Re-
publican party during the Civil War period. The former de-
cision (Ableman v. Booth)," reversing a decision of the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin, resulted in that State voicing a pro-
test and declaration of defiance based on extreme state
sovereignty concepts.20 This attempt to practically nullify the
Fugitive Slave Law and to obstruct the enforcement of the
judgments of the Federal Courts occurred on the very eve of
the Civil War. In Hepburn v. Griswold (I 870)21 the Supreme
Court declared that the Legal Tender Acts, passed during the
war and making Greenbacks legal tender, were invalid in so far
as they applied to preexisting debts. The Court divided five to
three-there being a vacancy on the Court, and there were
many persons who felt that the decision should be reversed. At
this critical point, Justice Grier resigned and Grant appointed
Justices Bradley and Strong to the Bench; the Hepburn Case
was overruled by a vote of five to four in Knox v. Lee
(1871)0 2 The majority judges in the Hepburn Case read
minority opinions in the Knox Case. Grant was said to have de-
liberately "packed" the Court, though the charges were prob-
ably unfounded.
It should be noted that in the above-mentioned attacks upon
the Court that body's unpopularity was not based upon its
having restricted the powers of the National Government.
Quite the contrary, the opposition was founded upon the fact
that National powers had been upheld to the great curtailment
of the rights of the States. Prior to the Civil War, in only two
decisions were acts of Congress held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States.2"
15 2i How. 506 (1859). For the Fugitive Slave Act and the Legal Tender
Acts, see 9 Stat. L. 462 (1850); iz Stat. L. 345 (1862), 709 (1863).
2 Ames, State Documents, no. 148 (19o6).
21 8 Wall. 603.
2 
zWall. 4 5 7.
22 Marbury v. Madisou, i Cranch 137 (1803), held sec. 13 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 invalid; Scott v. Sandford; 19 How. 393 (1857), declared
sec. 8 of the Missouri Compromise Act (18zo) to be unconstitutional.
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Attacks upon the Supreme Court may be attributed largely
to the fact that neither of its two most important powers are
granted in express terms in the Constitution. The author refers,
of course, to the Court's powers to pass upon the constitution-
ality of State and Federal legislation. The former power, con-
ferred by Congress in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 17892
was held by the Court to be a necessary power in order that
Article VI, clause 2, of the Constitution might be made
effective.25 The power of the Court to pass upon the validity of
congressional legislation was established by the Court itself (in
18o3) as an inherent and necessary judicial function. As stated
by Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison:
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law
be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to
the Constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which
of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very essence of
judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and
the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
they both apply."
26
Is this then the language of usurpation?
While it is true that the Constitution contains no express
grant of the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional,
a careful reading of the debates in the Constitutional Conven-
tion will lead one to the conclusion that the framers assumed
that this power would be exercised by the Court. The Randolph
Resolutions contained a provision for a Council of Revision to
be composed of the Executive and "a convenient number of
the National Judiciary."' The Council was to exercise a general
24 1 Stat. L. 73 (1789).
25 Cohens v. Virginia?, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
6 1 Cranch 137 at (1803).
27 x The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 21
(i91i). The Randolph Resolutions (Virginia Plan) were introduced May 29,
1787. See Resolution VIII.
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veto power over the National Legislature which might, how-
ever, override the veto by a.. .28 vote in both branches. El-
bridge Gerry (Massachusetts), whose substitute motion giving
the veto to the Executive (alone) was adopted, expressed an
opinion that the Judges had a sufficient check against encroach-
ments by the National Legislature-that the Court's exposition
of the laws involved "a power of deciding on their Constitu-
tionality."29 Later attempts by James Wilson (Pennsylvania)
and James Madison (Virginia) to associate the Judges with the
Executive in the exercise of the veto power were unsuccessful."0
In opposing one such motion, Luther Martin (Maryland) said:
"And as to the Constitutionalit3, of laws, that point will come before
the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have
a negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in the Revision
and they will have a double negative."'"
An able argument for including the Judges in the Council was
advanced by George Mason (Virginia). He admitted that the
Judges had the power to declare an unconstitutional law void,
but he also pointed out that much constitutional legislation
might be unjust and oppressive and the Court be powerless to
strike it down unless the Judges were made a part of the
Council."
While the proposed Constitution was before the States,
arguments in favor of (and in opposition to) ratification by the
States were based upon the Court's powers of judicial review.
Oliver Ellsworth, explaining the document to the Connecticut
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), said:
" The blank appears in the original resolution; the number was to be de-
cided upon later.
29 r The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 97
(191 i). To facilitate reading, parentheses which appear in the Farrand edi-
tion have been here omitted.
8o i The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 104
(1911) ; z The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 73,
298 (191x). The motions were offered on June 4, July zi, and August 15
by Mr. Wilson or Mr. Madison.
81 z The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 76
(1911).
32 z The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 78
(1911).
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"This Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general
government. If the general legislature should at any time overleap their
limits, the judicial department is a constant check. If the United States
go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does
not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who
to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to
be void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they
make a law which is a usurpation upon the federal government the law
is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it to be so."33
In an address to the Maryland Legislature (Nov. 29, 1787),
Luther Martin opposed this same power as a menace to the
States. He said:
"These courts [Federal], and these only, will have a right to decide
upon the laws of the United States, and all questions arising upon their
construction, and in a judicial manner to carry those laws into execution;
to which the courts, both superior and inferior, of the respective States,
and their judges and other magistrates, are rendered incompetent. To
the courts of the general government are also confined all cases in law
or equity, arising under the proposed constitution, and treaties made
under the authority of the United States . . . .Whether therefore,
any laws or regulations of the Congress, or any acts of its Presidents or
other officers, are contrary to, or not warranted by the constitution,
rests only with the judges, who are appointed by Congress to determine;
by whose determinations every State must be bound."'"
In an attempt to discredit the arguments of the Anti-
Federalist group (led by Governor Clinton) in New York,
Madison, Jay, and Hamilton joined forces in preparing a re-
markably able defense of the proposed Constitution. The fol-
lowing explanation is by Hamilton:
"Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from
an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judi-
ciary to the legislative power . . . . The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
33 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 240
( T91 a.83 The Records of 'the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., ?2o
(Ii).
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and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It there-
fore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or,
in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute;
the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. ' 'as
These statements, made by men who were active in the framing
of the Constitution, ought to convince the "Doubting
Thomases" that the limitations on the powers of Congress
were not intended to be left to the sole determination of that
body.
Opposition to the decisions of the Court has not been con-
fined to mere expressions of protest. Proposals to provide some
check or curb on the Court's power to invalidate congressional
legislation have been made from time to time. There has,
however, been a singular lack of agreement as to how this check
is to be effected. The most extreme proposal, of course, is to
deprive the Court completely of its powers of judicial review. "
The obvious defect in this plan is that the power of review
would still remain in the lower Federal courts and in the State
courts, and instead of one interpretation of the Constitution
there might be many. Whether an amendment to the Constitu-
tion would be necessary in order to deprive the Court of its
entire appellate jurisdiction is a matter for speculation.37 The
35 The Federalist, Ford ed., No. 78, pp. 520-521 (c. 1898). Marshall
had quoted from The Federalist, No. 78, in his opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
.mn, i Cranch 137 (1803)-the case which established the doctrine of judicial
review of acts of Congress. This fact led Mr. Ramsay (W. Virginia) to remark
in the House (July I 2, 1935): "Today we are, in the final analysis, governed
by a theory of government that was supposed to have died with the Federalist
Party, but we now feel the dead and withered hand of Alexander Hamilton,
directing through our Supreme Court, the policies of every administration, re-
gardless of which political party may be in power." 79 Cong. Rec. 11097
(1935).
:1' Charles Varren, Congress, The Constitution, and The Supreme Court,
chaps. V and VI (1935). These chapteis contain an excellent discussion of the
various proposals to curb the Court's powers of judicial review.
'7 For a discussion of the congressional power to prevent the exercise of
judicial review, through the withdrawal of the grant of appellate jurisdiction,
see 34 Michigan Law Review, 65o-670 (March, 1936).
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decision in ex parte McCardle (1868),38 however, is dear
authority for the contention that Congress can deprive the
Court of appellate jurisdiction in any case-even though the
Court has taken jurisdiction, has heard the argument, and has
taken the case under advisement. This power is vested in
Congress by Article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution
which reads: "In all the other cases before mentioned, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law
and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as
the Congress shall make." This is a dangerous power, and one
capable of upsetting the tripartite balance, should Congress see
fit to abuse it. That Congress has but once (in 1868) undertaken
to misuse this grant of power is a happy commentary on the
soundness of our basic principles of government.
Another proposed check, requiring an amendment to the
Constitution, would enable Congress to override the "cveto
power" (so-termed) of the Supreme Court. The adoption of
this means was urged by Senator LaFollette (Wisconsin) in an
address before the American Federation of Labor, in Cincinnati
(1922). " The Supreme Court had (the previous month) ruled
the Child Labor Tax Act unconstitutional, in Bailey v. Drexel
Firnitare Co. (1922)." It was to enable Congress to override
this "usurped judicial veto", that Senator LaFollette proposed
that Congress be given power to make an act constitutional
simply by repassing it. The proposal was later debated in the
Senate. It is worth remarking that Senator Kellogg (Minne-
sota) opposed the plan as a menace to the existing system of
checks and balances. 1 The real danger, of course, lies in the
abuse of such a power. For under the terms of the proposed
amendment, Congress could (by passing an act twice) alter the
Constitution, limit or abolish any department, or change the
form of government.
887 Wall 506.
19 6z Cong. Rec. 9o81 (I9z2).
40 259 U.S. 2o.
4" 6z Cong. Rec. 9073 (1922).
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A third proposal has as its goal a congressional act requir-
ing that seven out of the nine Justices concur in pronouncing an
act of Congress unconstitutional. In February, 1923, and again
in December, Senator Borah (Idaho) introduced such a bill in
the Senate. Both of the bills were referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary, but neither was reported out of the Committee."2
During the debate on Senator Black's (Alabama) "6-hour day
or 5-day week" bill (April, 1933) , Senator Borah expressed a
doubt as to the value of 5-to-4 decisions as a guide for future
legislation. He said:
"I desire to repeat that I have never felt myself bound by a 5-to-4
decision when it comes to legislating .... I am perfectly willing to
have the question resubmitted to the Supreme Court of the United
States in view of these divided decisions."43
To which Senator Barkley (Kentucky) replied:
"The 5-to-4 decision is not the thing that bothers me. It is a per-
fectly legal and binding decision, just as a law passed by the Senate and
the House by a majority of one is just as binding on the people as if it
had been passed unanimously . . . I have just as much respect for a
decision of the Supreme Court whether it is unanimous or whether it is
rendered by a majority of 5 to 4, because it is binding; and under our
theory of the rule of the majority, I think the Court is just as much justi-
fied in having its decisions by a majority of one respected as we would
be justified in having the people respect our statutes which are passed by a
majority of one. ' 4'
In the five-year period from 18i9 to 1824, Marshall per-
formed the labors of a juristic Hercules. His opinions in the
Dartmouth College Case (i81 9),45 McCulloch v. Maryland
(1819),4" Cohens v. Virginia (182I)," r Osborn v. Bank of the
United Stales (1824)," and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 49 as-
42 64. Cong. Rec. 3004 (1923); 65 Cong. Rec. 303 (1923).
43 77 Cong. Rec. 1185 (1933).
44 77 Cong. Rec. 1185 (I933).
45 4 Wheat. 518.
" 4 Wheat. 316.
'7 6 Wheat. 264.
48 9 Wheat. 738.
49 9 Wheat. i.
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serted the competence of the National Government to act within
its sphere of sovereignty, and laid down decisive limitations on
the States. During this Golden Age of expanding national-
ism, Kentucky too had its cause c6lbre. Troublesome contro-
versies arising out of the desperate condition of land tides had
prompted the Kentucky Legislature to enact a measure called
the "Occupying Claimant Law" for the settlement of conflicting
land claims. This act provided that no claimant, though he
prove title to the land in dispute, should be awarded possession
until he compensate the occupier for all improvements on the
land. The State courts upheld the act, but in 1819 the question
of constitutionality was raised in the Federal Circuit Court. The
case of Green v. Biddle" reached the Supreme Court in 182 1 ;
Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court, and held that
the Kentucky law was unconstitutional. When the news of this
decision reached the West, all Kentucky was aflame. Henry
Clay was directed to ask for a reargument of the case, and in
1822 the case was argued a second time. The following year
(Feb. 27, 1923) the Court rendered its decision; it affirmed its
former holding and again declared that the act was unconstitu-
tional. Marshall refused to sit in the case, and Todd and Liv-
ingston were prevented by ill-health from taking any part in
the decision. Thus the burden of deciding the case fell upon
four of the seven Justices, and, as Johnson dissented, the Ken-
tucky law was declared unconstitutional by but three Justices-
less than a majority of the membership of the Court. The
Court's first decision in Green v. Biddle (March, 1821)
prompted Senator Johnson (Kentucky) to propose an amend-
ment to the Constitution (Dec. I2, 1821) depriving the Su-
preme Court of appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
validity of State constitutions or statutes. He proposed that the
Senate be given this appellate jurisdiction.5 Some weeks later
(Jan. 15, 1822), Senator Holmes (Maine) moved a substitute
amendment providing that any Federal judge (or Justice) be
50 8 Wheat. i.
"
1Annals of Cong., 17 Cong., I Sess., col. 23 (821-1822).
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removed from office by the President of the United States, upon
the address of both Houses of Congress. 2 In December, 1823,
Senator Johnson suggested an inquiry into the advisability of
amending the Constitution in order to require that at least seven
Justices (the membership of the Court was seven) concur in any
opinion "which may involve the validity of the laws of the
United States, or of the States respectively." 3 Similar amend-
ments were proposed, by Kentucky's representatives, in 1824,
1825, 1826, and i829."4 The requisite number of concurring
Justices was variously fixed at seven, five out of seven, or two-
thirds of the membership of the Court. Senator Rowan (April
io, 1826) proposed the only amendment comprehensive enough
to include acts of Congress within its scope."
In the heyday of Reconstruction, when the Radicals in Con-
gress were overriding all opposition, a motion was carried in the
House to amend a bill referred to them by the Senate (January,
1868). The amendment provided that two-thirds of the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court must concur in declaring a Federal
law invalid. During the debate in the House, Mr. Williams
(Pennsylvania) proposed that a unanimous Court be required
to invalidate Federal legislation. Mr. Maynard (Tennessee)
suggested that this proposal be moderated so as to require the
concurrence of only three-fourths of the Court. The amended
bill died in the Senate.56
Returning now to the Borah proposal, it should be noted
that the Senator's bill made no provision for an amendment to
the Constitution. The question may fairly be raised whether
such an amendment would not be necessary. The right of a
mere majority of the Court to decide a case might well fall
"
2 Annals of Cong., 17 Cong., I Sess., col. 114 (1821-I822).
,' Italics mine. Annals of Cong., iS Cong., i Sess., col. 28 (1823-1824).
5' Annals of Cong., 18 Cong., I Sess., cols. 336, 2513, 2635 (1823-1824);
Register of Debates, 18 Cong., 2 Sess., col. 365 (1825); Register of Debates,
19 Cong., I Se~s., col. 423 (1S26); Register of Debates, 19 Cong., z Sess.,
col. 775 (1826-1827); Register of Debates, 20 Cong., z Sess., col. 152 (1828-
1829).
Register of Debates, 19 Cong., I Sess., cols. 423, 424 (I85-I8z6).
Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 478, 479, 489, 503 (1868).
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within the Court's judicial power. And while the Constitution
authorizes the Congress to regulate and make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court (Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 2), the
judicial power as vested in the Court is absolute and free from
control by Congress (Art. III, Sec. i)."
President Roosevelt's present plan for the reorganization of
the Federal judicial system suggests yet another means for pro-
viding a curb on the Supreme Court. By enlarging the member-
ship it is possible to "pack"--or, in light of the current con-
troversy, "unpack" if you prefer-the Court in order to insure
that a majority will sustain any and all legislation which the
party (politically dominant at the time) may enact. The re-
markable feature of this device is that it can be accomplished
through an act of Congress. While there is nothing sacred
about the number " nine"--the number of Justices on the Su-
preme Bench has been changed five times since the Court was
created"---one may fairly ask whether an independent Court is
not essential to the protection of minority rights. Hamilton,
writing in The Federalist, made a statement which is particu-
larly apropos of this. He said:
"This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men or the influence of particular
" In discussing the bill, Senator Borah was of the opinion that the power
of Congress to "regulate" the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was
warrant enough for the bill. 64 Cong. Rec. 3959 (I9z3).
'7a The Supreme Court, as originally created, consisted of six justices. Con-
gress found it expedient, from time- to time, to increase the membership of the
Court, until, in x863, the Court comprised ten justices. It is interesting to
note that, in 1866, Congress provided: "That no vacancy in the office of associ-
ate justice of the supreme court shall be filled by appointment until the number
of associate justices shall be reduced to six; and thereafter the said supreme
court shall consist of a chief justice of the United States and six associate
justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum." 14 Stat. L. 2o9 (1866). This
act was a political measure designed to prevent President Johnson from filling
any vacancies upon the supreme bench. When Johnson's term of office had
expired, Congress increased the number of justices to nine (1869); since that
time, the number has not been changed. i Stat. L. 73 (1789); 7 Stat. L. 421
(1807); 5 Stat. L. 176 (1837); xz Stat. L. 794 (1863); 16 Stat. L. 44
(1869).
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conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community."
58
Other remarks of Hamilton are worth pondering. After refer-
ring to "that fundamental principle of republican government
which admit§ the right of the people to alter or abolish the es-
tablished Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with
their happiness," he continued:
"yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the representatives
of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a
majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the
existing Constitution, would on that account, be justifiable in a violation
of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obliga-
tion to connive at infractions in this shape than when they had pro-
ceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the
people have by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed
the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively as well as
individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments
can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such
an act. But it is easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion
of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the
Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the
major voice of the community."' 9
In his message to Congress (Feb. 5), President Roosevelt
employed many a well-turned figure of speech. His challenging
statement that:
"Modern complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood
in the courts, just as it is needed in executive functions of the Govern-
ment and in private business. A lowered mental or physical vigor leads
men to avoid examination of complicated and changed conditions. Little
by little, new facts become blurred through old glasses fitted, as it were,
for the needs of another generation; older men, assuming that the scene
is the same as it was in the past, cease to explore or inquire into the
present or the future."'"
v The Federalist, Ford ed., No. 78, p. 523 (c. 1898).
See Note 58, sutra pp. 523-524-
co The United Statcz News, Feb. 8, 1937, p. 6.
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is fairly breath-taking in its implications. At the risk of being
thought presumptuous the writer would like to suggest that if
the people, through a carefully-worded amendment, would
write their will into the Constitution, it might aid materially
in providing new glasses for old eyes to use. The amending
process is not of necessity a dilatory one ; the most recent amend-
ment (Twenty-first) was ratified in less than ten months, while
the Twentieth Amendment was adopted in less than a year."
While it is true that thirteen States can defeat a proposed
amendment, and that consequently it is possible for a minority
of the people to prevent the majority from working its will, it
should be called to mind that our frame of government is Fed-
eral in part, and National in part. The small States (supporting
the New Jersey Plan)"2 threatened to withdraw from the Con-
stitutional Convention unless they were given an equal voice
in the National Legislature. The result was a compromise giv-
ing the small States equal representation in the Senate, but al-
lowing the large States to control the House. Likewise, the
provision that an amendment be ratified by the States was a
concession to the small States who feared domination by their
more populous neighbors. Perhaps the time has come when we,
as a people, should raze the Federal portion of our govern-
mental structure and rebuild wholly along National lines. If so,
let the change be orderly, and not by indirection.
If the President's proposal be read as an effort directed
primarily toward the creation of a Court which will sustain New
Deal legislation, then any discussion of a proper age for the
retirement of the Justices is so much surplusage. The people
have the right and the power to alter and interpret the rules of
government. The writer concludes that a proper use of the
amending process is preferable to a "packed" Court.
6' U. S. C. A., Constitution, part 3, PP. 175-177 of Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part (1936).
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Farrand ed., 24.2
(1911).
